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Settling dust? 
Reflections on the Judgments in Viking and Laval 
 
Niamh Nic Shuibhne 
School of Law, University of Edinburgh 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The judgments in Viking and Laval1 are already ‘classics’ in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). They have attracted extensive academic commentary;2 and, against a 
trajectory of deepening economic recession, they have claimed a rare (as ECJ decisions go) 
and rather notorious space in national and transnational public discourse. Together, the 
judgments raise vital questions that fall broadly within the theme of contested 
understandings of free movement law. They illustrate the consequences of market opening 
and raise questions about the way in which the interpretation of those consequences has 
evolved. Their reception has also revealed that traces of national protectionism are alive and 
very well, notwithstanding more than five decades of transnational market engineering.  
 Given the comprehensive legal analysis of the judgments that has already been 
published, from internal market, labour law and human rights (among other) perspectives, 
this contribution focuses mainly on one cross-cutting theme: the interplay between economic 
and social values, and its handling by the Court of Justice. Following a brief outline of the 
background to and decision in both cases, the article assesses the judgments under three 
broad headings: first, the coherence of the judgments within the existing framework of 
                                                          
1 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Eyggnadsarbetareförbundets avd. 1, Byggettan, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767;  Case C-
438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ 
Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779. 
2 The literature discussing these judgments provides a rich (and therefore quite daunting) resource for 
the researcher. See, for example: L Azouli ‘The Court of Justice and the social market economy: The 
emergence of an ideal and the conditions for its realization’, 45 CMLRev (2008) 1335; C Barnard ‘Viking 
and Laval: An introduction’ 10 CYELS (2007-2008) 464; A Dashwood ‘Viking and Laval: Issues of 
hozizontal direct effect’ 10 CYELS (2007-2008) 525; A Davies ‘One step forward, two steps back? Laval 
and Viking at the ECJ’ 37 ILJ (2008) 126; S Deakin ‘Regulatory competition after Laval’ 10 CYELS (2007-
2008) 581; C Kilpatrick ‘Laval’s regulatory conundrum: collective standard-setting and the Court’s new 
approach to posted workers’ 34 ELRev (2009) 844; C Joerges and F Rödl ‘Informal politics, formalised 
law and the “social deficit” of European integration: Reflections after the judgments of the ECJ in Viking 
and Laval’ 15 ELJ (2009) 1; J Malmberg and T Sigeman ‘Industrial action and EU economic freedoms: 
The autonomous collective bargaining model curtailed by the European Court of Justice’ 45 CMLRev 
(2008) 1115; T Novitz ‘A human rights analysis of the Viking and Laval judgments’ 10 CYELS (2007-2008) 
541; S Sciarra ‘Viking and Laval: Collective labour rights and market freedoms in the enlarged EU’ 10 
CYELS (2007-2008) 563; P Syrpis and T Novitz ‘Economic and social rights in conflict: political and 
judicial approaches to their reconciliation’ 33 ELRev (2008) 411. 
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internal market law; second, the weighting that is and/or should be accorded to social 
objectives in the project of market integration; and third, alternative ways in which, even 
preserving the Court’s traditional model for the resolution of free movement questions, the 
cases might have been reasoned and resolved. Finally, on the volume’s theme of the Single 
Market for 21st Century Europe,3 some broader questions about the evolving internal market 
and the role of law in shaping that market are raised. It is argued that, overall, there is 
nothing surprising about the judgments in legal terms. But it is also suggested that the Court 
of Justice missed an opportunity here to mould a more nuanced approach to free movement 
challenges, thinking especially at its heavy-handed determination of justification and 
proportionality in Viking but especially in Laval. Even so, however, it would appear that the 
Court remains the institution by far the most attuned to the purpose of market integration 
and to the continuing centrality of that objective in the broader integration story. 
 
II. Background: The cases and judgments4 
 
The factual situations in both cases are grounded in the enlargement of the internal market 
following the 2004 EU accessions, which accentuated the differential in working conditions 
and especially wages between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States. More specifically, the 
proceedings raised questions about the extent to which national social preferences can be 
overridden by – or, conversely, are capable of being preserved notwithstanding – a market 
space grounded in the promotion of free movement of services and freedom of establishment. 
They also reveal very plainly the two-pronged upshot of market enlargement: enhanced 
competition flourishes on one side, but concerns about social dumping emanate from the 
other. We can speak of a ‘social market economy’ as the cornerstone of EU market 
integration. Article 3(3) TEU as amended by the Lisbon Treaty now does; but it also asks that 
the EU social market economy be a ‘highly competitive’ one. At every turn, then, it would 
seem that economic and social objectives are programmed to ‘do battle’ in the EU context.5 
Moreover, across the EU, there exists a dramatic range of markets. Kilpatrick highlights this 
effectively when she compares the July 2008 statutory monthly minimum wages of Bulgaria 
(€112) and Luxembourg (€1610).6  
                                                          
3 European Commission, A single market for 21st century Europe, COM(2007) 724 final. 
4 The outline of Viking and Laval presented here is necessarily brief; for comprehensive discussion of the 
facts of and decisions in both cases, see Barnard, above n. 2. 
5 C O’Brien, ‘Social blind spots and monocular policy making: The ECJ’s migrant worker model’ 46 
CMLRev (2009) 1107 at 1140.  
6 Kilpatrick, above n. 2 at 865. 
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 In Viking, a Finnish company sought to re-flag one of its ships (the Rosella, which 
operated on the route between Tallinn and Helsinki) under the Estonian flag, so that it could 
hire an Estonian crew and pay those workers less than the existing Finnish crew. The 
International Transport Worker’s Federation (ITF), which had an explicit ‘Flag of 
Convenience’ policy and to which the Finnish Seaman’s Union (FSU, of which the Rosella’s 
crew were members) was affiliated, instructed the FSU and other affiliates to engage in 
industrial action to prevent the realisation of Viking’s plans. Following the breakdown of 
negotiations, which had included an undertaking from Viking that no redundancies would 
be effected during the initial re-flagging phase, Viking sought an injunction in the English 
High Court against the ITF and the FSU for both actual and threatened strike action, on the 
basis that the strike actions constituted restrictions on its right of establishment under (then) 
Community law.  
 Laval was a Latvian company whose wholly owned subsidiary (L&P Baltic Bigg, 
incorporated under Swedish law) won a contract to refurbish a school in Sweden. Laval sent 
its own Latvian workers, who were paid considerably less than Swedish workers 
undertaking similar work, for the execution of the contract. The Swedish union for 
construction workers wanted Laval to apply the Swedish collective agreement for the 
building sector; Laval refused to do this, being unsure, in particular, about the consequences 
for paying its workers (something not articulated expressly in the collective agreement but 
subsequently to be determined through collective negotiation). Strike action ensued, 
including picketing and blockades at the school site and sympathy actions undertaken by 
other unions. These actions were lawful under Swedish law but Laval challenged them on the 
grounds that they constituted a restriction on its freedom to provide services as protected by 
Community law.  
 In summary, the judgments established and/or confirmed the following legal 
principles: 
 
1) The right to take collective action is acknowledged to be a fundamental right within 
Community law; its exercise is, however, subject to limits laid down in both national 
and Community law.7   
2) Collective action such as that taken by unions in both cases falls within the scope of 
the EC Treaty provisions on both services and establishment.8 
                                                          
7 Viking, paras 43-44; Laval, paras 90-91.  
8 Viking, paras 60-66; Laval, paras 97-98. 
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3) The actions taken by the unions were found to constitute prima facie restrictions on 
these freedoms in both cases. 
4) This then triggered an assessment of justification and proportionality: the unions had 
to demonstrate that their actions were justifiable on public interest grounds and, even 
if this could be established, that they were proportionate in terms of the restrictions 
imposed on the market rights of Viking and Laval.  
5) In Viking, although determination of questions on justification and proportionality 
was left to the referring court in formal terms, the Court was very clear that action 
taken by the ITF to prevent companies from registering vessels in other Member 
States could not be justified.9 Regarding the action taken by the FSU, it was 
recognised that collective action for the protection of workers could be justified in the 
context of jobs or working conditions being ‘jeopardised or under serious threat’.10 
Again, the ECJ left the concrete resolution of this question for the referring court, 
while reminding that court that even if the action was justifiable, a proportionality 
assessment would then have to be applied: essentially, examining whether the FSU’s 
actions were suitable for attaining the objective pursued and ensuring that they did 
not go beyond what was necessary to attain that objective11 – in practical terms, were 
less restrictive means available to the union, and were those means were exhausted 
before embarking on the collective action? The case was settled, however, before the 
High Court could apply the ECJ’s judgment. 
6) In Laval, following an obviously services- rather than employee-oriented 
interpretation of the Posted Workers Directive,12 the Court accepted that, in principle, 
collective action to protest against social dumping could be a justifiable restriction on 
the free provision of services. But in this case, given that the collective agreement did 
not clearly outline core issues such as the level of payment to which Laval was being 
asked to commit, the Court decided (itself) that the action could not be justified.13 
Furthermore, applying the logic of mutual recognition, the failure of Swedish rules to 
accommodate protection guaranteed by a home State collective agreement that an 
undertaking had entered into was also found to restrict the free provision of services; 
                                                          
9 Viking, paras 88-90. 
10 Viking, para. 81. 
11 Viking, para. 87. 
12 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (OJ 1997 L18/1). The Court’s 
interpretation of the Directive was another controversial aspect of the judgment in Laval; these issues are 
discussed in section III(B) below.  
13 Laval, paras 108 and 110. 
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as a discriminatory restriction, only the grounds of public policy, public security or 
public health, as outlined in the Treaty itself, could be considered on this point but, in 
this case, no justification arguments on any of these grounds had been offered.14 
 
A critical analytical pivot on which the outcomes are considered to have turned is that, while 
the Court acknowledged the existence and fundamental nature of a right to take collective 
action in both cases, its prescriptive, market-oriented application of justification and 
proportionality, especially in Laval, meant that the substance of that right was, in effect, 
negated. This in turn exposes difficult questions about the extent to which the values and 
objectives of social policy are accommodated, at least, and prioritised within the broader 
ambitions of free movement law – in this instance, removing undue obstacles to freedom of 
establishment and the provision of services. The next section unpacks these charges in more 
detail. 
 
III. Were the judgments ‘wrong’? 
 
The following paragraphs look more closely at the judgments in Viking and Laval and at the 
criticism levelled against them using three strands of analysis: first, assessing the extent to 
which the outcome was, essentially, predictable in terms of free movement law more 
generally; second, focusing more specifically on the extensive critique grounded in the 
Court’s commitment, or otherwise, to social policy objectives; and third, looking at some 
alternative ways in which the justification/proportionality analysis could have been worked 
out. In doing so, the article seeks to distinguish concerns expressed about the form and 
substance of the judgments. Considerable criticism has been directed at both aspects; here, 
however, it is argued that both perceived problems and scope for more nuanced reasoning lie 
more properly in the latter.  
 
A. Form, predictability and coherence: Questioning the framework of free 
movement law 
 
The arguments made in this contribution are grounded in a basic preliminary assertion: that 
the judgments in Viking and Laval were, in legal terms at least, predictable and rational; and 
that they fit coherently within the internal market framework applied consistently by the 
                                                          
14 Laval, paras 112-119. 
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Court of Justice. In this section, concentrating first on the form of the judgments, the Court’s 
application of the basic structure and principles of free movement law is defended; the 
substance of the decisions, looking at the material outcomes reached and with more specific 
emphasis on the nature and role of social objectives, is then examined in parts B and C. 
The free movement case law is not a perfect model of consistency. Scholars often 
direct criticism (and sometimes frustration) at the Court’s decisions from the perspective of 
jurisprudential coherence. But in one core respect at least – the application of the three-step 
restriction/justification/proportionality methodology – the case law is as formulaic, and 
therefore reliable, as case law can get. Furthermore, almost every national rule or practice 
challenged is found to be a restriction on free movement law, thus triggering the next steps in 
that process.15 The breadth of this capture is certainly open to criticism in a substantive sense 
but a consistency in approach is overwhelmingly apparent. In respect of Viking and Laval, it has 
been repeatedly suggested that it was open to the Court to find that labour law and social 
rights were outside the scope of Community law altogether – in other words, a finding that 
the actions of the unions could not, therefore, constitute a restriction on free movement rights 
in the first place. This argument can be further broken down into three assertions: first, that 
the actual subject matter of the disputes should have led the Court to decline jurisdiction, 
given the absence of direct legislative competence for the Community to regulate the right to 
take collective action in the context of negotiations with an employer; second, that the 
fundamental status of the right to take collective action similarly removed the cases from the 
scope of ECJ review; and, third, that the reach of free movement law should not have been 
extended horizontally so as to catch the actions of unions at all.  
On the first point,16 it must be emphasised the Court does not reason in this way, 
irrespective of subject matter, when the ‘competing’ (see further, section B below) market 
claims flow from the free movement provisions. As was clearly reaffirmed in both judgments, 
even in policy areas for which national regulatory competence would seem to be exclusive 
(e.g. determination of nationality; regulating social security and direct taxation, organisation 
of the armed forces), the Court will nonetheless review national choices against the general 
                                                          
15 For a recent example of this, see the 2009 use of goods case law on the scope of Article 28 EC (Case C-
110/05 Commission v Italy, judgment of 10 February 2009, nyr and Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos, 
judgment of 4 June 2009, nyr); for discussion and analysis, see T Horsley ‘'Anyone for Keck’, case 
comment, 46 CMLRev (2009) 2001 and E Spaventa ‘Leaving Keck behind? The free movement of goods 
after the rulings in Commission v Italy and Mickelsson and Roos’ 34 ELRev (2009) 914. 
16  See Viking, paras 39-40; Laval, paras 86-88. Barnard has remarked that finding otherwise could have 
been ‘the easy way out’ for the Court (C. Barnard ‘Social dumping or dumping socialism’ 67 CLJ (2008) 
262 at 263). 
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principles of Community law, especially nationality discrimination.17 Labour law fell 
similarly victim to ‘EC Law’s empire’18 in Viking and Laval, but – crucially – no more than any 
other competence areas impacting on free movement law had before it. If the Court had acted 
differently on this point, the judgments would have been strikingly inconsistent with the 
broader corpus of free movement case law. This is not something that was acknowledged in 
the submissions to the Court. The point was made with regard to labour law per se, but no 
new or special case was put forward that took account of the relevant, and firm, line of case 
law on subject specific exclusions more generally.  
Similarly, second, the Court has never excused itself from grappling with situations 
involving the protection of fundamental as well as free movement rights. Notwithstanding 
submissions to the contrary in both Viking and Laval, the Court again affirmed a clear line of 
case law within which it has been established that the protection of fundamental rights may 
constitute a legitimate public interest reason that justifies a (proportionate) restriction on free 
movement law – but this is precisely what must be shown; classification of a given claim as a 
fundamental right is not in itself enough to remove the disputed scenario from the scope of 
free movement law.19 Remember too that, even when establishing the existence of an EU 
fundamental right, the Court has long tied itself to drawing from the common constitutional 
traditions of its Member States and to the international obligations that those States have 
assumed. It is therefore inevitably harder to attempt to settle on the merits of one particular 
level of social protection when the State ‘raw materials’ themselves diverge so much. It must 
also be acknowledged that looking to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to ascribe 
‘fundamental’ status to the right to strike, as the parties in both cases did here, has an inverse 
consequence too – because it confirms that such questions do form part of Community law to 
some extent.  
Third, the span of horizontal effect within free movement law was also clarified in 
Viking and Laval. The Court’s decision on this question was somewhat more innovative than 
the case law threads summarised immediately above.20 But again, the outcome was 
                                                          
17 See, for example, Case C-369/90 Micheletti and others v Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-
4239, para. 10 (determination of nationality); Case C-120/95 Decker v Caisse de Maladie des Employes Prives 
[1998] ECR I-1831, paras 22-23 (social security); Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer plc v Halsley (Her Majesty 
Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-10837, para. 29 (direct taxation); and Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief 
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, para. 26 (organisation of security forces). 
18 Azouli, above n. 2 at 1341. 
19 Viking, paras 42-46; Laval, 89-95; citing Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659 and 
Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt 
Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609. 
20 For a critique of and proposed alternative to the declaration of horizontal effect in both cases, see 
Syrpis and Novitz, above n. 2. 
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predictable if we remember that regulatory decisions of sporting associations have long been 
captured by Community law.21 The application of this case law in Laval is broadly considered 
to have been a logical extension of the existing rules.22 The judgments do leave open some 
broader questions, however; for example, would the Spanish Strawberries/Schmidberger 
approach applied to non-State restrictions under Article 28 EC be relevant to services or 
establisment in the case of, for example, wildcard strikes that may not be lawful under 
national law but in respect of which a government (or indeed, a union?) did not act to stop? It 
is also unclear whether the horizontal reach of free movement law might go further still, into 
the realm of responsibility for the individual as has already occurred with respect to the free 
movement of workers.23  
The devices that the Court does sometimes use to find that something is not a 
restriction of free movement rights were not relevant and thus not invoked either in these 
cases. There was a cross-border element in both disputes,24 thus the situations were not 
wholly internal to one Member State and thereby outwith the scope of free movement law. 
Neither could it be said that the unions’ actions were too remote from or uncertain in their 
effects on the provision of services or freedom of establishment25 – on the contrary, the very 
real and certain impact of the actions undertaken led to the instigation of the proceedings in 
the first place.  
                                                          
21 This line of case law begins with Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405, paras 17 and 18; cited 
in Laval, para. 98, but not in Viking (see n. 22 below). 
22 In Viking, the principle of State responsibility for tackling free movement restrictions effected by 
private actors comes from Case C-265/95 Commission v France (Spanish Strawberries) [1997] ECR I-6959, 
para. 30; and Schmidberger, paras 57 and 62. That jurisprudence is normally considered as authority for 
the absence of horizontal direct effect in the context of Article 28 EC. Unhelpfully, the Court used this 
case law in Viking for the related but different point, finding support there for a general principle about 
non-State responsibility for free movement restrictions (see para. 62, drawing from para. 38 onwards of 
the Opinion of AG Maduro). In contrast to the reasoning set out in Viking, Dashwood, above n. 2 at 534, 
commends instead the ‘analogical reasoning’ applied by AG Mengozzi in Laval towards extending the 
case law on sporting associations to trade unions. It is not clear whether any difference in legal effect 
was intended by the use of different authorities for the horizontal scope point in Viking and Laval. Both 
were judgments came from an identically composed Grand Chamber, although different Advocates 
General and juges rapporteur were responsible for each case. 
23 Case C-281/98 Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano [2000] ECR I-4139, para. 36. In Viking, AG 
Maduro sketched a similar responsibility for individuals across the spectrum of free movement law, 
while also discussing the limitations that might attach to such an imposition on private autonomy; see 
paras 31-54 of his Opinion. 
24 Cf. Deakin, n. 2 above from 589 onwards, however, who argues that this was not clearly apparent 
from the facts of Laval. 
25 Drawing from Case C-190/98 Graf v Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH [2000] ECR I-493, Deakin offers an 
alternative view for Laval, pointing out that workers must take a host State’s regulation of labour law as 
they find it and proposing a similar principle with respect to services (at 607). This analogy underscores 
the reverse situation of posted workers, however, since they are defined by the Court as precisely not 
seeking access to the host State’s labour market (e.g. Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417, 
para. 15).  
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Thus, that the Court engaged its three-stage restriction, justification and 
proportionality paradigm in Viking and Laval is a predictable and consistent application of the 
framework of free movement law. The ease with which an actual or potential, direct or 
indirect,26 or even likely restriction on free movement can now be established is undoubtedly 
controversial. That debate might well include the judgments in Viking and Laval, but it is so 
much bigger than these judgments. It ripples right across the different Treaty provisions of 
free movement law.27 What seems absent from reflections that criticise Viking and Laval from 
this perspective, focusing on the form of the judgments, is an acknowledgement that if the 
Court had proceeded any differently, the framework of free movement law would have been, 
in consequence, either dis-applied or fundamentally altered. Either way, it would have been 
an asymmetric outcome and it would have needed to be rationalised against the enormous 
weight of jurisprudence to the contrary. 
Azouli has explained the methodology typically applied by the Court by invoking 
the image of a collage. Unpeeling the judgments in Viking and Laval, he traces how a 
patchwork of case law principles is pulled together from across the spectrum of ECJ 
jurisprudence. While the application of this collage methodology to Viking and Laval has been 
criticised,28 Azouli points out that the technique ‘form[s] the conceptual and ideological 
framework of the Court’s reasoning [offering] security and permanence in the judicial 
work’.29 The Court has certainly fudged decisions in some instances in a way that does seem 
influenced by the subject matter of the case.30 And its willingness to engage in the questions 
that come before it irrespective of the nature of the dispute has often drawn criticism on a 
case-by-case basis. But what choice does it have? In responding to the questions that are sent 
to it by national courts and tribunals, the Court has resolutely refused to abandon the 
framework of free movement law on the basis of the subject matter of a preliminary reference 
alone.31 To do otherwise would open up a problematic discretionary function for the Court 
                                                          
26 Recalling the formula in Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, para. 5. 
27 For example, see again the articles cited in n 15 above regarding the use of goods case law. 
28 See Barnard, n. 2 above at 492. 
29 Azouli, n. 2 above at 1339-1340. 
30 The conflation of services and economic links in Grogan comes to mind as a good example of this, 
against the backdrop of highly sensitive questions about how States regulate abortion and abortion 
advertising (Case C-159/90 Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC) v Grogan [1991] ECR I-
4685; see further, N Nic Shuibhne ‘Margins of appreciation: National values, fundamental rights and EC 
free movement law’ 34 ELRev (2009) 230 at 244. 
31 The Court does sometimes decline jurisdiction in preliminary reference cases on grounds including 
the hypothetical nature of the national dispute. For a brief outline of this and other relevant criteria, see 
paras 45-47 of the judgment in Laval. 
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that has no place in the preliminary reference procedure or in the functions of case law more 
generally. 
The inevitability of the outcome achieved through the material or substantive 
determination of justification and proportionality is never, however, so certain. As Azouli 
himself remarks, application of the collage of legal reasoning does not ‘dictate the outcome. 
Finding the actual solution remains a product of imagination.’32 Bearing this in mind, the next 
section explores more deeply the extent to which the social objectives pitted against the free 
movement of services and freedom of establishment in both cases could or should have made 
more of a material difference. We saw above that conceptualisation of collective action as a 
fundamental right was not, by itself, enough to bring the cases outside of the free movement 
law framework. In other words, there was no reason to rethink the form of this case law. But 
should the fundamental status of the social objectives underpinning the unions’ actions and, 
more specifically, the protection of workers have nonetheless contributed to a different 
outcome in substance? Proceeding from an acceptance of the restrictions on free movement as 
legitimate in both cases, these questions are examined below in the context of justification and 
proportionality, the next steps in the framework. The relationship between the judgment in 
Laval and the Posted Workers Directive, which raises important questions about the interplay 
between negative and positive integration, is also discussed.  
 
B. The substance: Transposing the social market economy to the market 
framework 
 
The judgments in Viking and Laval and the rich scholarship addressing them have amplified 
uncomfortable questions about the privileging of short-term trade gains over nationally 
embedded social guarantees and, concurrently, about the extent to which the latter should be 
protected as European values within the framework of market integration. This critique can 
thus be framed in two ways, either as support for the devolution of social protection, and/or 
regret at the weakness of social policy infusion into the premises and application of free 
movement law itself.  
On the first point, the judgments bring into sharp focus the extent to which States 
may (and, left alone, would choose to) do things differently. National market rationales are 
often deeply different when viewed through a social policy optic; and those differences are 
often deeply rooted in political, sociological, and cultural choices – as well as being reflective 
                                                          
32 Azouli, n.2 above at 1340. 
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of the priorities and capacities of national economies. To what extent can the transnational 
market level these differences? To what extent should it? This is not as simple either as an 
‘old/new’ State clash. The UK, which, as the location of the ITF headquarters, found itself to 
be something of an accidental participant in Viking, is not exactly known for being 
comfortable with prescribed levels of social protection that might unduly, in its view, hamper 
business initiative. It is worth remembering too that the unions who took action in these cases 
did not have ambitions to transplant a higher or ‘European’ level of social protection across 
the Union. Rather, they sought (in Laval) to ensure that national understandings of social 
protection continued to apply within the national territory and (in Viking) to block 
transnational enterprise. When do these actions cross the line into undue protection of 
national jobs, when do the intentions of the unions change from legitimate and justifiable 
social protection into market-thwarting national protectionism? And, more difficult still, who 
should decide? 
Second, looking more at the prospect of European social values, this line of argument 
sees the judgments as problematic from, in effect, the opposite angle: that the ECJ failed in its 
EU responsibility to integrate higher thresholds of social protection into its articulation of 
contemporary free movement law. A latent criticism in the same vein is that the ECJ failed to 
integrate higher thresholds of social protection into (national) arrangements suggested to be 
lacking. In terms of free movement law’s framework, this question is more about working 
social policy driven questions and priorities into it than disapplying it. The potential 
contribution of the Posted Workers Directive is relevant here too: did it prescribe a minimum 
European standard of social protection (the second or European point) or did it enable States 
to insist that their own, higher, standards of protection had to be applied with respect to 
workers temporarily posted in their territories (the first or devolution point)? It was 
suggested in part A above that forsaking the framework of free movement law was not an 
appropriate step to take for the resolution of these tensions, so that any room for manoeuvre 
in Viking and Laval lay most likely in a more socialised understanding and application of the 
justification and proportionality steps (and/or the Posted Workers Directive in Laval). These 
issues will now be examined in more detail. 
 
1. Socialising the Framework 
 
It was noted above that the application of the free movement framework in Viking and Laval 
has been criticised because of the inherent implications of this methodology. Framing this 
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question from a more self-consciously social perspective, it means that, in essence, 
irrespective of how much the Court talked about balancing the economic and social objectives 
set out in (then) Articles 2 and 3 EC, ‘[t]he moment collective action is found to be a 
“restriction”…the “social” interests are on the back-foot, having to defend themselves from 
the economic.’33 The Court seemed initially to suggest that it would embark on its analysis in 
a balanced way, even implying that priority might in fact be given to the relevant social 
objectives in both cases: ‘[s]ince the Community has thus not only an economic but also a 
social purpose, the rights under the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital must be balanced against the objectives pursued by social 
policy’ – interestingly, here, not the other way around.34 But this would appear to be the social 
high watermark of the judgments. The framework of free movement law was applied in a 
straightforward way thereafter, reverting to the normal restriction (economic)/justification 
(social) sequence. Perhaps no-one outlines the powerful rationale behind this converse, 
market-oriented starting point clearer than Advocate General Maduro in Viking.35 He argued 
that nothing in the Treaty itself suggests that social rights should always take precedence over 
‘the objective of a properly functioning common market’.36 He also suggests that collective 
action in the transnational context essentially impedes the hiring of, in that case, Estonian 
workers in an attempt to protect Finnish workers – the type of barrier that ‘entirely negates 
the rationale of the common market’ and therefore raises charges of overt nationality 
discrimination and protectionism.37 In other words, Advocate General Maduro reasoned that 
this is simply how free movement law works. Notwithstanding the range of objectives listed 
in the Treaty’s introductory articles, the specific free movement provisions are clearly 
structured on a restriction/justification basis. The free movement framework applied by the 
Court simply mirrors the framework pinned down in primary law.  
If this is true, then why do the judgments seem just, wrong to so many people? In 
contrast to the outcome in Viking and Laval, Azouli and O’Brien draw expressly from 
Schmidberger in terms of its ‘practical method for…reconciliation’ (Azouli) and as an example 
of ‘integrated interpretation’ (O’Brien).38 In Schmidberger, an officially sanctioned 
environmental protest, which necessitated the closing of an inter-State motorway for over 30 
                                                          
33 Barnard, above n. 16 at 264. 
34 Viking, para. 79; Laval, para. 105. 
35 For academic analysis also grounded strongly in the value and demands of free movement, see N 
Reich ‘Free movement rights v social rights in an enlarged Union: The Laval and Viking cases before the 
ECJ’ German Law Journal (2008) 125. 
36 Viking, Opinion of AG Maduro, para. 23. 
37 Ibid., para. 68. 
38 Azouli, n. 2 above at 1349; O’Brien, n. 5 above at 1137. 
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hours, was found to be a legitimate and proportionate restriction on the free movement of 
goods. In balancing the free movement and fundamental rights interests (freedom of 
expression and of assembly) in this case, the Court stated that the national authorities (against 
whom, for having authorised the protest, the action was directed) enjoyed ‘a wide margin of 
discretion’.39 There is a question worth asking here, however; even if applying a 
reconciliatory or integrated process, does the outcome not require one set of objectives 
nonetheless to take precedence in some way in any given case? Does this more ‘balanced’ 
process not mean, really, that economic and social objectives are still competing but that the 
social goals (or, as in Schmidberger, the protection of fundamental rights) are found to trump 
the interests of spreading the internal market instead?  
The even more State-sensitive approach taken by the Court in Omega, which 
sheltered the German understanding and protection of human dignity from the right to 
provide transnational services through a very understated application of proportionality 
stands similarly in contrast to the prevalence accorded to free movement in Viking and Laval. 
The free movement framework was applied, in formal terms, in the same way in all three of 
these decisions. But the outcome was very different in Omega. There, a clear margin of 
appreciation was delineated for Germany and, whatever the Court might have said,40 for the 
operation of its constitution.41 Why did the Court act so differently in Viking and Laval? There, 
the Court rather cleverly engaged Omega as authority for the fact that the fundamental nature 
of a right did not preclude review of the exercise of those rights against Treaty freedoms. The 
application of this as a legal principle or precedent was supported in part A above. But what 
differed profoundly was the way in which proportionality was applied in Omega. The formal 
application of free movement law looks the same, but significant allowances were made in 
Omega in the substance. With the framework intact, the reasons behind the difference would 
not appear to be ones grounded in legal reasoning. If human dignity is a no-go area but 
nationally (often, constitutionally) protected understandings of social protection are open to 
subjugation where they unjustifiably and disproportionately hinder free movement rights, 
where (and indeed, what) is the mythical ‘line’ between the two from the perspective of the 
Court of Justice? The constitutional protection of human dignity in Germany, on its own, is 
not enough to explain the difference. Article 17 of the Swedish Regeringsformen protects the 
right to take collective action. More generally, the Court has consistently repeated and 
                                                          
39 Schmidberger, para. 82. 
40 Omega, para. 34. 
41 Omega, para. 39. 
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applied the principle, originating in Simmenthal,42 that the source of national law is irrelevant 
in the context of EU law primacy. Even in Schmidberger, the most interesting discussion on 
balancing free movement and protection of fundamental rights43 took place under the express 
‘justification’ heading; the free movement framework had already been applied, and a 
restriction on free movement had already been established, requiring then to be justified. 
What Schmidberger offers is an example of lighter touch justification and proportionality 
review. It does not invert the framework of free movement law per se. But something quite 
different happened, also in Omega, in the application of justification and proportionality in a 
context involving the protection of fundamental rights.  
I have argued elsewhere that a constitutionally rooted theory of fundamental State 
boundaries that the ECJ is willing to recognise could explain the different outcomes in these 
cases to some extent.44 Other factors stem from the murkier, more subjective sphere of the way 
in which preferences are expressed when the Court engages in substantive adjudication of 
justification and proportionality. Perhaps too, to some degree at least, there is an underlying 
awareness of the economic scale and importance of the sectors affected by the relevant 
judgments – one 30 hour closure of one motorway in Schmidberger; preventing the emergence 
of a laser ‘killing games’ sector in one State in Omega; questions about regulatory competition 
on a significantly greater scale, however, in Viking and Laval. The undercurrent of 
protectionism emerging as the economic climate worsened may also have contributed to the 
harder line taken by the Court;45 this may not have seemed like the time even to appear to 
endorse the insulation of national jobs from the wider market. Part of the solution may also 
lie in the States’ own failure, legislatively, themselves to indicate the kind of social priority to 
the field of posted workers that the Court could or would not find in Laval; this is discussed 
in the next section. An alternative approach to justification and proportionality will then be 
worked out in section 3.  
 
2. Socialising the Legislative Context 
 
Writing in an academic capacity in 1999, before his term as Advocate General, Maduro 
observed that ‘the free movement of persons has been developed as a function of economic 
efficiency: the intent is on optimal allocation of labour under the mechanisms generated by 
                                                          
42 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. 
43 See Schmidberger, paras 77-81 especially. 
44 See again Nic Shuibhne, n. 30 above. 
45 Sometimes, much more overt than an undercurrent; see the contribution to this volume by E 
Spaventa. 
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market integration’.46 Notwithstanding the evolution of EU law in the interim decade, even 
considering the legal substantiation of EU citizenship that has been a significant part of things 
this statement is remarkably prescient regarding the interpretation given to the Posted 
Workers Directive in Laval. Discussion of the Directive centred primarily on the inclusion of 
‘minimum rates of pay’ in a list of conditions in Article 3(1) that had to be guaranteed in host 
States for workers posted temporarily from other Member States. The host State standards 
were to apply as regards these conditions so long as they were laid down in law or in a 
universally applicable collective agreement – neither of which was the case as regards the 
Swedish collective bargaining framework; it may be recalled that the collective agreement 
which Laval was being asked to sign neither spelled out the applicable wages nor had erga 
omnes (universal) effect. Furthermore, there is no legislatively codified minimum wage in 
Sweden.  
Sciarra is one of the few commentators to suggest that the Court might have avoided 
at least some criticism by having focused in more depth on Sweden’s ‘imprecise 
implementation’ of the Directive.47 The critical point latched onto in the judgment instead 
was that the measure’s legal basis was Article 55 EC, not the Treaty’s social provisions, and 
this was clearly the deciding factor in its interpretation by the Court. In other words, the 
Directive’s primary purpose was confirmed as the facilitation of the provision of services, not 
the protection of working conditions or a means to give effect to host State social policy 
(above and beyond the defined and very limited core of minimum standards of protection 
detailed in Article 3(1) of the Directive).48 Given the uncertainty on the question of wages in 
Laval, which was set to be resolved only after the company had first signed the Swedish 
collective agreement for the construction sector, the Court thus moved on from the Directive 
to address  whether there was a restriction flowing from the Treaty provisions on services 
directly.  
                                                          
46 M. Poaires Maduro ‘Striking the elusive balance between economic freedom and social rights in the 
EU’ in P. Alston (ed.) with M. Bustelo and J. Heenan The EU and Human Rights, (Oxford OUP 1999) 449 
at 462. 
47 Sciarra, n. 2 above at 578-9. 
48 See the clear ascription of priorities in paras 75-76 of the judgment in Laval. For a contrary 
interpretation of the Directive, see Deakin, n. 2 above at 597. Deakin argues that attribution of, first and 
foremost, a social purpose to the Directive is ‘in so many words, clearly indicate[d]’; he also suggests 
that such an interpretation would be ‘consistent with the widely accepted understanding of other social 
policy directives and regulations, which do not seek to set out either uniform laws or even a level 
playing field, but to establish a floor of rights above which regulatory competition is possible.’ This 
aligns with the kind of integrated interpretation approach favoured by O’Brien on conceptual terms, but 
it does not deal directly with the question of respective, express legal bases. 
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The Court made a choice, therefore, but it made a choice that is expressly 
underscored by the intentions of the Community legislature. Commentators point to Recital 
17 of the Directive’s preamble (‘[w]hereas the mandatory rules for minimum protection in 
force in the host country must not prevent the application of terms and conditions of 
employment which are more favourable to workers’) to suggest that the Court’s 
interpretation of the Directive was, therefore, simply wrong. But it is arguably possible to 
read ‘more favourable conditions’ as referring to the home State – another example, perhaps, 
of the tacit yet prevalent ‘country of origin’ preference built into the regulation of cross-
border services.49 Moreover, the first four recitals focus exclusively on the provision of 
services; even in Recital 5, which speaks about ‘guaranteeing respect for the rights of 
workers’, this is expressed alongside the need for fair competition. Other references to a 
‘nucleus of mandatory rules’ and ‘hard core of clearly defined protective rules’ do seem to 
support, on balance, the Court’s ‘ceiling rather than floor of protection’ characterisation of the 
Directive.50 Interestingly, a dilution of the national discretion that had been presumed to be 
afforded through minimum harmonisation directives is also evident in internal market case 
law more generally.51 This is not to say that the balance of protection settled on by the Court 
is therefore right; but it does ask that criticism must be directed just as much at the legislature 
as it has been at the Court. Could the Court have chosen here to effect a more socially 
balanced interpretation? Yes; but it is suggested that this would have been to construe the 
Directive against an overly stretched and not an actual reading of its purpose and objectives, 
which must be extrapolated from reliance on more than one of its provisions. This recalls the 
point made above, then, about the extent to which calls for balanced interpretation are asking 
for, in reality, priority for social objectives. There is nothing wrong with this in principle; but 
it needs to be acknowledged that the ramifications of success for free movement law more 
generally would be significant indeed. The usefulness of such a reading might have been of 
                                                          
49 Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer [1991] ECR I-4221, para. 12. In the context of Laval, Deakin, n. 2 
above, refers to this as the principle of ‘regime portability’. 
50 This outcome is emphasised by several commentators; see, for example, Barnard, n. 2 above at 477-78 
and Kilpatrick, n. 2 above at 847 onwards.  
51 There are clues to this effect in the Tobacco Advertising judgment (Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament 
and Council (‘Tobacco Advertising’) [2000] ECR I-8419, paras 103-105; the insistence on the necessity of a 
free movement clause in the challenged directive seems to undermine the logic of minimum 
harmonisation in the first place. For a contrary view on the significance of this, see S Weatherill ‘Supply 
of and demand for internal market regulation: Strategies, preferences and interpretation’ in N. Nic 
Shuibhne (ed.) Regulating the Internal Market, (Cheltenham Edward Elgar, 2006), 29. 
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limited value in the Laval case itself in any event, given the thorny issue of horizontal effect of 
directives.52  
The judgments have been criticised for causing a problem; but perhaps they have in 
fact revealed a real problem – in the field of posted workers, because of the degree to which 
their protection as workers is considered as subsidiary to the competitive success of their 
employers: not just by the Court but within the internal market per se which, in this instance, 
has been subject to legislative intervention. Already considered by the Court to be outwith 
the scope of more general EU legal protection of workers,53 those who are posted temporarily 
to other States to fulfil work obligations outside their home States seem strikingly cast as the 
last remaining ‘factors of production’, realising still the original image of Community 
workers that the case law on free movement of persons more generally has long tried to 
shake off. With its subsequent judgments in Rüffert54 and Commission v Luxembourg,55 
however, the stance of the ECJ on this point has been hardened.  
Maduro also noted in 1999 that ‘the gap between negative and positive integration 
has generated spill-over effects favouring economic freedom against social rights at the 
national level’.56 The judgments in Viking and Laval illustrate most acutely how true that 
remains. Redressing the negative/positive integration imbalance provides a real manifestation 
of and opportunity for the reconciliatory/integrated approach to blending the economic and 
social objectives to which the Union is, Treaty-wise, committed. So the legislature must act. It 
would have to do so now against an uncomfortable imprint of restraint, given the sheer 
power exuded by Article 49 EC through the momentum of case law. Maduro finds some 
optimism, however, in the ‘defence and promotion of social policies’ exhibited by secondary 
legislation in the field of labour law when this is expressly intended.57  
 
                                                          
52 See similarly, Deakin, n. 2 above at 595. This would have raised a whole other set of legal questions, 
beyond finding that trade unions can come within the scope of Articles 43 and 49 EC. See further, 
Dashwood, n. 2 above. Barnard has also noted the double-bind for unions regarding the Posted Workers 
Directive to the extent that the Court did discuss its applicability; though found to fall within the scope 
of Community law in terms of restricting the provision of services (and may engage justification 
arguments in that context), their non-public status shuts down access for unions to the specific public 
policy mechanism in Article 3(10) of the Directive (see Laval, para. 84; and Barnard, n. 2 above at 473). It 
is worth noting, however, that even where a State is involved, the decision in Case C-319/06 Commission 
v Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-4323 shows the extremely limited space for public policy derogation through 
Article 3(10). 
53 Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte [2001] ECR I-7831, 
paras 22-23. 
54 Case C-346/06 Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1989. 
55 Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-4323. 
56 Maduro, n. 46 above at 463. 
57 Ibid. at 465.  
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3. Socialising justification and proportionality: Strikes cause disruption but isn’t that 
the point? 
 
At this stage, a number of arguments have been suggested: in summary, that the way in 
which the Court approached both judgments was systematic and in keeping with both the 
framework and rationale of free movement law; that the Court is nonetheless required by the 
Treaty properly to consider the impact of social objectives on the realisation of the internal 
market; that it could not have done so in its interpretation of the Posted Workers Directive in 
Laval without undue blurring of the legal signposts built into the measure itself; and that the 
ideal of ‘balanced’ interpretation of economic and social objectives can be something of a 
misnomer, if the underlying argument or preference is, in fact, that priority should be 
accorded to social objectives. But a concern was also observed that there is, nonetheless, a 
remarkable certainty in the tone of the Court regarding its application of justification and 
proportionality (in both judgments, but especially in Laval), in contrast to other cases in which 
constitutionally embedded fundamental rights have been weighted ‘against’ free movement 
claims, notably Schmidberger and Omega. Apart from (legitimate) procedural questions about 
the de facto resolution of cases by the Court within the Article 234 EC system,58 it must be 
emphasised that in both Viking and Laval, Advocates General Maduro and Mengozzi 
respectively offered more detailed, nuanced and socially-sensitive analyses on justification 
and proportionality.59 The way in which the Court balanced economic and social concerns 
was not, therefore, the only way. In Viking, there was also the possibility, at least, of an 
interesting outcome back in the national court. The reasoning of the Advocates General is 
firmly rooted in the framework of free movement law in both cases, seeing the actions of the 
unions as restrictions that must be justified and proportionate, and so the solutions outlined 
do not go as far as some would want. They are more outcome than process focused. But they 
do demonstrate the potential for greater accommodation of social concerns even within the 
framework of free movement law. And that is surely, ultimately, the key point. 
As Davies has pointed out, the implications of the judgments, in contrast, pose a stark 
and seemingly irreconcilable tension between EU and labour law: the more effective the 
                                                          
58 The Court’s decisiveness and precision in respect of the outcome in Laval can be contrasted, for 
example, with how comfortable it was with factual ambiguities underpinning the validity of the 
reference; compare paras 43-49 of the judgment in Laval with the analysis by Deakin, n. 2 above. 
59 See Viking, Opinion of AG Maduro, para. 62 onwards; in Laval, see the Opinion of Ag Mengozzi, para. 
241onwards. Commenting on the solutions proposed by the Opinions, see Barnard, n. 2 above at 479-
481; see also, M Rönnmar, ‘Free movement of services versus national labour law and industrial 
relations systems: Understanding the Laval case from a Swedish and Nordic perspective’ CYELS (2007-
2008) 493 at 518 onwards, discussing the aftermath of Laval in particular.  
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industrial action from the perspective of the union, the more difficult it will be to justify 
and/or meet proportionality requirements.60 Strike action is one of the most effective tools 
that unions can invoke and not to take account of this suggests that the Court utterly de-
contextualised its reasoning from the specifics of industrial relations, generating an 
unfortunate proportionality paradox.61 Drawing also on the horizontal effect point, used here 
for the benefit of rather than ‘against’ the employer, Azouli has argued that the Court 
fundamentally misjudges the relative power of the players involved, and most especially and 
in contrast to its case law historically, it does so at cost to the position of and options available 
to the workers.62 
The seeds of another mechanism through which a more favourable justification 
and/or proportionality analysis could have been undertaken, acknowledging the specific 
resonance of strike action within industrial relations, could lie in one of the ITF and FSU 
submissions in Viking: ‘since certain restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services are inherent in collective action taken in the context of collective negotiations’, 
then the Court’s reasoning in Albany should be applied.63 In Albany, collective agreements 
were found to fall outside the scope of Article 81(1) EC given the social policy objectives that 
they pursue, notwithstanding the ‘inherent’ restrictions they can effect on competition.64 In its 
judgment in Viking, the Court rejected the relevance of that submission. The stronger of its 
counter-arguments is simply that ‘the fact that an agreement or an activity are excluded from 
the scope of the provisions of the Treaty on competition does not mean that that agreement or 
activity also falls outside the scope of the Treaty provisions on the free movement of persons 
or services since those two sets of provisions are to be applied in different circumstances’.65 
The more disputable statement precedes this: ‘it cannot be considered that it is inherent in the 
very exercise of trade union rights and the right to take collective action that those 
fundamental freedoms will be prejudiced to a certain degree’.66 Simply put, why not? Novitz 
criticises the mistaken conflation here of collective agreements and collective action. She 
expressly recognises potential for the kind of recognition of transnational interests within 
                                                          
60 Davies, n, 2 above at 143. 
61 For example, Sciarra has observed that ‘[i]n attempting to adopt the language of labour law, the Court 
does not ultimately capture its deepest message’ (n. 2 above at 564). 
62 Azouli, n. 2 above at 1354. 
63 Viking, para. 48 (emphasis added), citing Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting 
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-5751.  
64 Albany, para. 59. 
65 Viking, para. 53. At para. 54, the Court also confirmed that there can be no general exemption of 
collective agreements from the scope of free movement law. 
66 Viking, para. 52. 
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collective agreements, as advocated by Sciarra and Kilpatrick.67 But, as Novitz rightly points 
out, ‘it is difficult to imagine how collective action taken against any employer could not be 
regarded as having some negative effect on the employer’s exercise of [Treaty] freedoms’.68 
Finally, Novitz draws from several examples of the more context-sensitive reasoning she 
urges the Court to consider within ILO jurisprudence.69 
 The Albany route per se does not seem very promising, then, given the easy option 
still offered simply by distinguishing free movement and competition circumstances and 
legal contexts.70 But we can find a recent example of Albany-style, more tempered application 
of justification and especially proportionality elsewhere within free movement law itself. In 
UTECA, the Court of Justice recently assessed Spanish legislation on the funding of films 
against inter alia Article 49 EC.71 In particular, requirements that television operators had to 
allocate 5% of their operating revenue for the previous year to the funding of full-length and 
short cinematographic films and European films made for television and 60% of that funding 
to the production of films of which the original language is one of the official languages of 
Spain were challenged by the Unión de Televisiones Comerciales Asociadas (UTECA). The 
Court applied the three-step framework of free movement law, discussing the objective of 
protecting Spain’s multilingualism in the context of justification and proportionality and 
finding nothing to suggest that the national measures were disproportionate in that case. The 
interesting paragraph for present purposes finds that; 
[t]he fact that [a linguistic] criterion may constitute an advantage for cinema 
production undertakings which work in the language covered by that criterion and 
which, accordingly, may in practice mostly comprise undertakings established in the 
Member State of which the language constitutes an official language appears inherent 
to the objective pursued. Such a situation cannot, of itself, constitute proof of the 
disproportionate nature of the measure at issue in the main proceedings without 
rendering nugatory the recognition, as an overriding reason in the public interest, of 
                                                          
67 Sciarra, n. 2 above at 580. See similarly, Kilpatrick, n. 2 above at 864, who advocates an approach that 
makes ‘collective bargaining internally sensitive to foreign needs’ (emphasis added). Writing in an 
academic capacity in 1999, Maduro argued that ‘our conception of fundamental social rights must 
change and can no longer be opposed to economic freedom’ (n. 46 above at 471). 
68 Novitz, n. 2 above at 550. 
69 Ibid. at 558-559. 
70 In his Opinion in Viking, AG Maduro rejected the submission on similar grounds, noting the built-in 
mechanism for balancing economic and social objectives in free movement law that is not possible 
within competition law; see para. 27. It has been observed, however, that the Advocate General was 
more successful in the application of this balancing than the Court itself was considered to have been. 
The potential for problematic balancing thus remains. 
71 Case C-222/07 UTECA v Administración General del Estado, judgment of 5 March 2009, nyr; I am grateful 
to Bruno de Witte for raising this judgment for discussion in a different context. 
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the objective pursued by a Member State of defending and promoting one or several 
of its official languages.’72  
This way of thinking about proportionality needs to be worked out by the Court in more 
detail, to ensure that this version of the test does not itself undermine the contribution of 
proportionality assessment in the first place. It does offer an attractive logic for certain 
disputes, however, and it could have made a material difference to the Court’s thinking about 
collective action (notably in Laval). And there is a further interesting twist in the UTECA case: 
in contrast to the Posted Workers Directive, the Television Without Frontiers Directive73 
expressly allows Member States to introduce stricter measures towards the achievement of 
linguistic protection goals. Again, then, the interplay between negative and positive 
integration is exposed as a critical gap in the social protection of posted workers. The Court 
recognised this notion of ‘inherent restriction’ to some extent in Viking, in respect of the action 
taken by the FSU, when it observed that ‘it is common ground that collective action, like 
collective negotiations and collective agreements, may, in the particular circumstances of a 
case, be one of the main ways in which trade unions protect the interests of their members’.74  
In Viking, the Court referred to European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law 
in support of this view.75 Barnard argues that the Court immediately ‘undermined’ this 
promising statement, however, by its ‘last resort’ approach to industrial action in its 
subsequent articulation of proportionality.76 The Court of Justice has long cited Strasbourg 
primary law and case law in its judgments. Interestingly, the ECtHR now frequently engages 
EU instruments in its own judgments too, notably the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It 
could be significant, then, that, after the judgments in Viking and Laval, the Strasbourg court 
intensified its own conception of freedom of association as protected by Article 11 ECHR. In 
Demir v Turkey,77 the ECtHR emphasised that it ‘does not accept restrictions that affect the 
essential elements of trade-union freedom, without which that freedom would become 
                                                          
72 UTECA, para. 36 (emphasis added). 
73 Council directive of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting 
activities (OJ 1989 L298/23), as amended. 
74 Viking, para. 86. 
75 Viking, para. 86, citing Syndicat national de la police belge v Belgium (1979-80) 1 EHRR 578 and Wilson, 
National Union of Journalists and Others v United Kingdom of 2 July 2002, 2002-V, § 44. 
76 Barnard, n. 2 above at 483; see Viking, para. 87 (instructing the national court to ask whether FSU had 
‘other means at its disposal which were less restrictive of freedom of establishment in order to bring to a 
successful conclusion the collective negotiations entered into with Viking, and… whether that trade 
union had exhausted those means before initiating such action’). 
77 (2009) 48 EHRR 54. 
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devoid of substance.’78 The ECtHR also recognised, for the first time, a right to collective 
bargaining, as one of the ‘essential elements’ of the right of association.79 We must be careful 
to remember that appropriate limitations to the exercise of these rights are accepted within 
the Strasbourg framework too; and we should not conflate collective bargaining and 
collective action in the way the Court of Justice was criticised for doing in Viking and Laval. 
But the strengthening language of Strasbourg is unmistakeable. Moreover, its frequent cross-
references to EU law leave us in no doubt that Viking and Laval were part of the legal context 
in which the Court of Human Rights chose to amplify its own previous case law and to 
suggest that enhanced protection for association rights had evolved over time. All of this 
seems to signal that greater respect will have to be accorded to the toolbox inherent in 
collective bargaining, and that toolbox inherently includes collective action. The approach 
taken in UTECA offers an assessment of proportionality through which these considerations 
can be taken into account while simultaneously ensuring that the free movement law 
framework can be preserved. 
Finally, it is worth reflecting briefly on another inherent tension that is heightened by 
Viking and Laval: that free movement rights are typically constituted or interpreted as 
individual rights, contrary to the collective ethos underpinning social rights. This point 
emphasises that the rights claimed by the companies in both cases configure not only a ‘trade 
versus social’ dichotomy. They also reflect a privileging of the individual over the collective.80 
There are parallel examples within other strands of internal market case law too – thinking, 
for example, of how individuals’ claims to medical treatment typically supersede justification 
arguments about the structural aspects of national health-care systems.81 That free movement 
has not itself emerged as a shared collective good is, however, another interesting reflection. 
Advocate General Maduro’s Opinion in Viking perhaps comes closest to this interpretation of 
things. More specifically, he touched on a degree of responsibility that needs to be assumed 
by workers themselves in the transnational employment context.82 We have also seen calls for 
unions themselves to take the special situation of posted workers on board in their own 
                                                          
78 Demir v Turkey, para. 144. Similarly, at para. 146, the Court affirmed that ‘limitations to rights must be 
construed restrictively, in a manner which gives practical and effective protection to human rights’. 
79 Demir v Turkey, para. 150. 
80 For discussion on this point, see Novitz, n. 2 above at 544-5. 
81 For an example of failed justification arguments in this context, see Case C-444/05 Stamatelaki v NPDD 
Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron Epangelmation (OAEE) [2007] ECR I-3185, para. 30 onwards. 
82 See para. 59 of the Opinion: ‘workers throughout Europe must accept the recurring negative 
consequences that are inherent to the common market’s creation of increasing prosperity, in exchange 
for which society must commit itself to the general improvement of their living and working conditions, 
and to the provision of economic support to those workers who, as a consequence of market forces, 
come into difficulties’. 
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negotiations which have cross-border implications.83 Trade union, employee and media 
reactions to Viking and Laval did not really reflect or embrace this kind of shared commitment 
to market opening or to the wider (and even deeper) ambitions of integration that market 
opening exemplifies. Requiring social objectives to be justified against free movement claims 
might seem more palatable if viewed against this expression of a shared commitment to the 
value of free movement too. Does widespread disengagement from a commitment to or even 
the benefits of the internal market mean that the broader ambitions underpinning the free 
movement ideal have somehow ‘failed’ in the EU context? 
 
IV. Conclusions: Viking, Laval and the 21st Century Internal Market  
 
It has been argued in this contribution that, even without a revolutionary change in how free 
movement cases are resolved in formal or process terms,84 the Court could have explored a 
more socially sensitive interpretation in Viking and in Laval in a substantive sense, either by 
re-orienting the centre of gravity of the Posted Workers Directive in Laval and bringing the 
prominence of its social dimension more to the fore (possible, but thought here to be beyond 
the proper remit of the Court looking at the weighting of the objectives coded into the 
measure, taking its provisions as a whole) or by recognising the particular or ‘inherent’ 
consequences of industrial action more readily in a less authoritarian justification and 
proportionality analysis (the preferred solution). Subsequent case law does not seem 
promising on either front thus far, apart from an isolated recognition of ‘inherent’ free 
movement restrictions in a different context in UTECA. But a legislative responsibility was 
also emphasised, towards ensuring that posted workers are not exploited so as to facilitate 
unfair and inappropriate regulatory competition. 
The concrete issues resolved in (and indeed, those remaining problematic since) the 
judgments in Viking and Laval provoke an interesting question about the role of law (and 
more specifically, case law) in market integration: is the realisation of a sufficiently rounded, 
multilaterally transposable (in theory at least) transnational market driving the development 
                                                          
83 See again, n. 67 above. 
84 The revolutionary quality of the interpretative shift in question here is well demonstrated by two of 
the examples O’Brien uses in collating an alternative approach to balancing economic and social 
objectives (n. 5 above at 1137); the use of services rather than citizenship as the interpretative basis of 
Case C-60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279 and the apparently 
general recourse to fundamental rights obligations, outwith the free movement of workers in Case C-
109/01 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607 have attracted sharp criticism 
from what we could broadly term free movement lawyers. For further discussion, see N Nic Shuibhne 
‘Derogating from the free movement of persons: When can EU citizens be deported?’ 8 CYELS (2005-
2006) 187 at 199-200 and 205-6. 
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of EU free movement law; or is the development of EU law more autonomously driving some 
sort of economically skewed, overly simplistic version of the internal market? More precisely, 
is the social market economy potentially meaningful, or is it only meaningful if the Court 
decides so? Going further, it is worth asking whether, in the 21st century, when attention 
seems to radiate more readily outwards towards addressing challenges such as climate 
change and global financial dependency, the internal market seems like a small, antiquated 
and inward-looking project with little relevance for contemporary challenges. An unflattering 
conception of the EU, thinking of the ECJ’s approach to these inward-focused market 
dimensions, evokes neither a nascent federal state nor a sui generis ‘something’, the ideas 
normally debated in discussions about the nature of the EU as a polity; but the arguably less 
benign image of an empire, mentioned briefly already85 but worth taking further. This empire 
seeks to dissolve internal borders, levelling divergent value systems. This is, to me, an 
exaggerated picture, but it was clearly felt by some to be the case in the aftermath of Viking 
and Laval. That is somewhat worrying and demands to be taken seriously.  
The empire analogy is a depiction rather clumsily evoked by Commission President 
Barroso himself but for present purposes it is more about a manifestation of, borrowing 
(crudely) from Dworkin, law’s empire.86 The judgments in and debates surrounding Viking 
and Laval illustrate a disjunction in terms of the power of the Court on free movement matters 
and the contemporary political emphases of the EU and its institutions more generally. States 
may have presumed the protection of national differences through devices such as reserved 
competences and minimum harmonisation, but such choices remain greatly vulnerable to 
negative integration. Commentators are broadly agreed that where secondary legislation in 
the social field has been adopted, the Court has dealt subject-sensitively with any related 
disputes that have arisen. But what we see in Viking and (thinking of the Posted Worker 
Directive dimension, especially in) Laval is that the national values at stake became 
susceptible to what has emerged as an imperial rather than collectively shared goal of market 
integration – in large part, because the Member States have not taken ownership of their own 
market-place.  
Does the Commission’s template for the 21st Century Single Market recognise and 
address these challenges? The Communication offers ‘encompass[ing] a strong social and 
environmental dimension’ as one of four challenges, noting that ‘single market policy must 
take full account of the social and environmental implications of market opening’.87 But the 
                                                          
85 See n. 18 above and accompanying text. 
86 See further, N Nic Shuibhne ‘Is it time to worry yet?’ 34 ELRev (2009) 521. 
87 European Commission, n. 3 above at 3.  
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Commission then establishes that the focus of the Communication will be on ‘new working 
methods … better regulation … a more varied set of tools and a more impact-driven 
approach’88 – in other words, forms of governance to secure better implementation and 
enforcement. Without wishing to undermine the critical significance of implementation, it 
nonetheless seems that, to use the language applied by this article elsewhere, the 
Communication is singularly focused on form rather than first engaging with deeply 
contested questions of substance. Where the Communication does go on to address the ‘social, 
environmental and cohesion dimension’ more specifically – over just two pages in total – it 
refers to a ‘set of shared rights and values’ and to ‘[maintaining] a level playing field’ in terms 
of workers’ rights’89 – rather missing the converse reality that led to the proceedings in Viking 
and Laval in the first place. More telling perhaps is the reference to ‘unleash[ing] the single 
market’s full potential’.90 The Court is certainly on track for helping to achieve that objective.  
The volume, fervour and sincerity of the reactions (academic and otherwise) to Viking 
and Laval show that questions about regulatory competition matter very much indeed. The 
paleness of the Communication in terms of any contribution it makes to managing the 
difficult realisation of both economic and social objectives is acutely disappointing. The 
impression remains, therefore, that free movement is currently an imperial rather than 
shared, collective goal. Are we content to ‘leave’ the internal market to the Court, acting 
almost alone? Again, the reaction to Viking and Laval would suggest otherwise. Although the 
outcome in both cases has been criticised here in one respect (justification and 
proportionality), the Court did, at least, deal with the questions sent to it, not evading the 
issues because of their difficult, sensitive or controversial nature. The Court went on to 
receive ample criticism, often simply for dealing with the cases at all. Maybe it should be 
blamed just a bit less for doing so. In the Single Market for 21st Century Europe, the profoundly 
important questions raised by Viking and Laval – how to reconcile divergent social traditions 
in a competitive ‘single’ market space; how and to what extent internal market law as 
developed by the Court should determine such matters – do not find any real reflection in the 
Commission’s Communication and thus seem unlikely to engage the States or the European 
Parliament any time soon.91 Why not?  
                                                          
88 Ibid. at 4. 
89 Ibid. at 10-11. 
90 Ibid. at 10. 
91 Subsequent measures such as the Commission Recommendation of 31 March 2008 on enhanced 
administrative cooperation in the context of the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services, 2008 OJ C85/1 also appear to gloss over the more contested questions exposed by the Court’s 
judgments. 
